The Moral Progress Approach allows that moral progress can take place on different levels, from different perspectives. (…) Just as individuals can become morally better individuals, the world can become a better world and the human species can become a better species. In this way, the Moral Progress Approach can make at least a degree of sense of most if not all instances of evil. (…) The more meaningless an instance of evil from the perspective of other ‘greater good’ approaches, the more valuable any change for the better from the perspective of moral progress.”

Seyyed Mohsen Eslami & Dan Egonsson, “Progress on the Problem of Evil”, 6.

In this short post, I offer some thoughts based on my reading of “Progress on the Problem of Evil”, a recent article by Seyyed Mohsen Eslami and Dan Egonsson.[1] If you are interested in the problem of evil you may also want to check out my post Evil and Omnipotence. As I indicate in that post, there are goods which require the (prior) existence of evils to exist. But there I don’t give any specific examples. Well, some plausible candidates for such goods are specific forms of progress or improvement. Think, for instance, of forms of cosmic progress / improvement which involve a world becoming less evil and more good over time. Obviously it is a good thing if a world is characterized by such a development. But a world can only become less evil if it contains evil in the first place.

It is important to speak of forms of progress or improvement, for, it seems, not all sorts of (moral) progress require the existence of evils. Something that is already completely good could, it appears, get better (e.g. by simple addition of good features). In light of this, one might have questions about what Eslami and Egonsson say in the conclusion of their article: “If moral progress has final value, one must accept a God who is unable to create a world containing that value without also allowing evil.” Why would God favor a world, W1, which has a mixture of good and evil and gets better and less evil over time, over a world, W2, that contains only good and simply gets better over time? Wouldn’t any W without some evil, e, be better than any W with e?

Well, it may of course be that W1 contains so much more goodness than W2 that it is the better option. The reduction of evil could be one of the goods that tips the scales in favor of the former world. Further, perhaps W1 has a greater diversity of goods and that makes W1 better than W2. After all, W2 contains no goods which require the existence of evils (since it is a world without evils), but W1 could in principle contain goods which require goods as well as goods that require evils. But wouldn’t God always prioritize the minimalization of evils over the maximalization of goods? Well, that seems a bit simplistic. It seems more plausible that God would prioritize the minimalization or prevention of certain kinds of evils over the actualization of certain goods, but would decide to actualize very great goods even if this meant actualizing some minor evils.

---

[1] Seyyed Mohsen Eslami and Dan Egonsson, “Progress on the Problem of Evil,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2021): 1-16, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09672559.2021.1918748.

“In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. (…) However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it we need some additional premises (…) These additional principles are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. From these it follows that a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.”

J.L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 200-201

J.L. Mackie’s 1955 article “Evil and Omnipotence” is a well-known piece of twentieth century philosophy of religion.[1] I will not be discussing the entire article here, I rather want to use it as a starting point for some reflections on the standard logical problem of evil, on which, roughly, the existence of a wholly good and omnipotent God is incompatible with the existence of any evil. If the existence of such a God is indeed incompatible with the existence of any evil, then there is a serious problem for theists who believe in an omnipotent and wholly good God, since some evil seems to exist. As we can see above, Mackie sought to show the incompatibility of the existence of such a God and the existence of evil and in the process he made use of two principles: (1) “good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always elmininates evil as far as it can” and (2) “there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do”. If these principles are true, then, indeed, the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent and wholly good God. Moreover, a strong argument could then be constructed against the existence of such a God, something, for instance, along the following lines:

1. If any evil exists, no wholly good and omnipotent God exists.
2. Some evil exists.
3. Therefore, no wholly good and omnipotent God exists.

So, are Mackie’s principles true? Both initially seem somewhat plausible. But we may nevertheless have some questions about them. First, what does it mean exactly that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can? Does it mean that a good being always makes the total amount of evil as small as possible, even if that involves doing evil? Suppose, for instance, that a good person could prevent a serial killer from killing tens of people and could thus make the total amount of evil smaller than it otherwise would be, but could only do so by killing the serial killer, would that person then kill him? Or would a good person, by definition, be unable to do something evil, even if that would minimize the total amount of evil?

When it comes to the second principle we might wonder whether it is really true that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. Consider the following argument:

1. If there is something an omnipotent thing cannot do, then there are limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.
2. An omnipotent thing cannot not be omnipotent while it is omnipotent.
3. If (2), then there is something an omnipotent thing cannot do.
4. Therefore, there are limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.

Now, one may object that an omnipotent being by definition is such that there are no limits to what it can do. Well, if that is true, then maybe the theist should concede that there is no omnipotent God and instead insist that there is a wholly good God whose power is perfect. Perfect power seemingly does not require being able to the impossible. If it were the case that one can be perfectly powerful and unable to the impossible, then there seems to be a way in which such a God and some evil could co-exist. After all, if the evil were impossible for this God to eliminate, then the existence of this evil would be compatible with the existence of such a God. But surely, one might say, there is no (possible) evil that is impossible for such a God to eliminate?

Well, maybe things are not quite so straightforward. Consider the following scenario: A wholly good God exists who has perfect power, but is not able to do the impossible (we’ll call this being God₂). This God is faced with the choice of creating or not creating contigent beings and is free to choose either option. However, God₂ cannot actualize any old world with contigent beings. Because God₂ is wholly good, God₂ cannot, for instance, actualize worlds with on balance more evil than goodness and cannot actualize a certain world if God₂ could actualize one with more goodness (in cases where the total amount of evil is equal). But many contigent goods are such that they require the (prior) existence of some evil to exist. Now, suppose that all worlds with greatest amount of goodness include such contigent goods. It follows that if God₂ creates a world with contigent beings, God₂ cannot but create one with some evil. The evils in question would not exist necessarily, since God₂ could decide not to create any contigent beings. Moreover, the evils in the maximally good worlds need not be the same. Lastly, it need not be the case that evils exist at every moment of the history of these worlds. If this scenario is (logically) possible, then it seems the existence of God₂ is compatible with the existence of (some) evil.

---

[1] J.L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64, no. 254 (1955): 200-212.

This month I’m working on the fourth chapter of my thesis. This chapter deals with the issue of how new arguments for God are to be evaluated. For this chapter I have developed a 16-point checklist that can be used to evaluate an argument for God. Since this checklist might be useful to others (and can perhaps be improved in various ways), it is posted here below. I’m aware, of course, that on some matters (e.g. plausibility) opinions will differ more strongly than on others (e.g. form).

Checklist

1. Form: Does the argument have an appropriate deductive, inductive or abductive form?
2. Non-circularity: Is the argument non-circular, at least explicitly?
3. Modesty: How modest are the premises of the argument?
4. Plausibility: How plausible are the premises of the argument?
5. Acceptability: Can the premises be accepted consistently by a non-theist? Can they be incorporated easily into a nontheistic belief system?
6. Controversiality: How controversial are the argument’s premises? To what extent are they (already) disputed or rejected as false?
7. Agreeability: How likely are people to agree with the premises if confronted with them?
8. Belief: To what extent are the premises (already) believed by experts, non-theists and humanity generally?
9. Scrutiny: To what extent has the argument faced and withstood critical scrutiny?
10. Argumentative support: Are there arguments available in support of the premises? How good are these arguments?
11. Objections: Are there objections available against the argument? How good are these objections?
12. Relative goodness: Is the argument better than (many) other arguments for God?
13. Persuasive power: Has the argument convinced people of its conclusion?
14. Soundness: If the argument has an appropriate form, are all the premises true?
15. Significance: Is the argument an argument for God in the primary sense (concludes that God exists) or in the secondary sense (supports the thesis that God exists)?
16. Additional features: Does the argument have additional good-making features?

As you may know, I’m writing a MA thesis on new philosophical arguments for God developed within recent natural theology and analytic philosophy of religion (2000-2020). And, althought my training is in theology, in the past month or so I’ve formulated some arguments myself (see, for instance, this previous blogpost). Perhaps the arguments below are not particularly good arguments, but they have a few things going for them: (1) they seem deductively valid, (2) they start from a rather modest premise that at least some nontheists will think true or at least plausibly true, and that seems rather costly to deny, and (3) they lead straight to the conclusion that God exists. The arguments are somewhat abstract, appealing as they do to some x, which could, perhaps, be anything from a particular religious experience to an entire universe. In light of this, I am not quite sure how to categorize them. Since they make use of modal notions and principles, and have causal elements, we might call them modal-causal arguments. Further, it seems to me that the talk of ‘possible worlds’, which might be confusing to people unfamiliar with analytic philosophy, can be simply exchanged for talk of ‘possible versions of reality’ or even ‘possible states of affairs’. Lastly, I find the arguments below interesting and am still in the process of examining and developing them.

Modal-Causal Argument Type 1: There Is Some X

Argument 1

1. There is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. If (1), there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
3. God, by defintion, is such that if God exists or has existed in some possible world, God exists eternally in all possible worlds.
4. If God exists eternally in all possible worlds, then God exists.
5. Therefore, God exists.

Argument 2

1. There is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. If (1), there is a possible world, W1, in which x exists and in which x is or has been caused (partially) by God.
3. For God to (have) (partially) cause(d) x in W1, God must exist or must have existed in W1.
4. If (1)-(3), there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
5. Therefore, there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
6. God, by definition, is such that if God exists or has existed in some possible world, God exists eternally in all possible worlds.
7. The actual world is a possible world.
8. If God exists eternally in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
9. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
10. Therefore, God exists.

Modal-Causal Argument Type 2: There Possibly is Some X

Argument 1

1. There possibly is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. If (1), there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
3. God, by definition, is such that if God exists or has existed in some possible world, God exists eternally in all possible worlds.
4. If God exists eternally in all possible worlds, then God exists.
5. Therefore, God exists.

Argument 2

1. There possibly is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. If (1), there is a possible world in which there exists an x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
3. If there is a possible world in which there exists an x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God, then there is a possible world, W1, in which x exists and x is caused or has been caused by (partially) by God.
4. For God to (have) (partially) cause(d) x in W1, God must exist or have existed in W1.
5. If (1)-(4), there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
6. Therefore, there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
7. God, by definition, is such that if God exists or has existed in some possible world, God exists eternally in all possible worlds.
8. The actual world is a possible world.
9. Therefore, God exists in the actual world.
10. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
11. Therefore, God exists.

Some Remarks

A number of argumentative strategies could be employed in defense of the first premise of the above arguments. First, one could appeal to (the fact of) shared seemings and beliefs in arguing for the truth of the first premise. Theists (typically) believe that there are things which are (partially) caused by God and, doing so, are arguably committed to the first premise. Moreover, the denial of the first premise is arguably incompatible with the affirmation of divine omnipotence. However, it seems, many nontheists also believe or at least find plausible what is claimed by the first premise. Second, one could offer a number of very plausible candidates for x. For such candidates one could look to things that are appealed to in other arguments for God. Third, if one has presented a number of such candidates one could develop an inductive argument for x arguing that the existence of (plausible) candidates for x is more likely on the hypothesis that there is (possibly) an x, than on the hypothesis that there is not (possibly) an x. Fourth, one could put forward an inductive argument for there (possibly) being an x from the ontological diversity and richness of (potential) reality.

The second premise of the shorter arguments can be defended with an argument along such lines:

1. There is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. Either there is a possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God or there is no possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God.
3. If there is no possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God, then x could not be possibly caused (partially) by God.
4. If (1)-(3), then there is a possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God.
5. It is not possible that God does not exist in a possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God.
6. Therefore, there is a possible state of affairs in which God exists.

The third premise of the shorter arguments is more or less a partial definition of God or a statement of certain characteristics of God, or at least characteristics God is often thought to have (necessary existence, eternal existence). If necessary, the argument can be reformulated such that it is an argument for a being that essentially exists necessarily and eternally, and essentially is perfectly good, powerful, knowing, etc.

The fourth premise of the shorter arguments is pretty uncontroversial, but if necessary modifications can be made to the argument (e.g. spelling out that the actual world is a possible world and so forth).

As you may know, I working on a master’s thesis on new philosophical arguments for God developed in recent natural theology and philosophy of religion, under the supervision of the Dutch philosopher Emanuel Rutten. Today I did a little work on one of Alexander Pruss’s ontomystical arguments, as found in his “Samkara’s Principle and Two Ontomystical Arguments” (2001), and his article has helped me come up with a number of arguments which may or may not be novel arguments for God. If you have encoutered arguments along these lines elsewhere or see ways of improving the arguments, please get in contact. In any case, you can find three potentially new arguments for God below:

An Argument from Religious Experience

1. A religious experience has occured which is such that it is possibly caused by God.
2. If (1), then God exists in at least one possible world.
3. God is such that if God exists in one possible world, God exists in all possible worlds.
4. If God exists in all possible worlds, God exists.
5. Therefore, God exists.

A Cosmological Argument

1. An event has occured which is such that it is possibly caused by God.
2. If (1), then God exists in at least one possible world.
3. God is such that if God exists in one possible world, God exists in all possible worlds.
4. If God exists in all possible worlds, God exists.
5. Therefore, God exists.

Another Cosmological Argument

1. A being exists which is such that it is possibly caused by God.
2. If (1), then God exists in at least one possible world.
3. God is such that if God exists in one possible world, God exists in all possible worlds.
4. If God exists in all possible worlds, God exists.
5. Therefore, God exists.

More arguments along such lines can of course be drawn up. Arguments on the basis of the following additional argument for God could also be drawn up, which does not necessarily take something in the actual world as starting point:

1. There is an x in some possible world such that x is possibly caused by God.
2. If (1), then God exists in at least one possible world.
3. God is such that if God exists in one possible world, God exists in all possible worlds.
4. If God exists in all possible worlds, God exists.
5. Therefore, God exists.

I’m writing a thesis on new philosophical arguments for God and one of the arguments that I intend to include in my thesis is a cosmological argument of my supervisor, the Dutch philosopher Emanuel Rutten, found in his Towards a Renewed Case for Theism (2012), which seemingly has not received very much attention yet. This cosmological argument is an argument for a first cause, in the sense of “an uncaused cause whose effect is ontologically prior to every other caused object” (p.124). The argument draws on atomism, the view on which each composite object is in the end composed of simple objects, and causalism, the view that every object is caused by or is the cause of another object. If an object, A, is ontologically prior to another object, B, A’s existence is required for B’s existence, but B’s existence is not required for A’s existence. Rutten’s argument is as follows (see p.126-127):

1. There are objects,
2. Every composite object is ultimately composed of simple objects (atomism),
3. Every object is caused by or is the cause of another object (causalism),
4. The sum of all caused simple objects, if not empty, is an object,
5. The cause of an object is disjoint with that object,
6. Every caused composite object contains a caused proper part,
7. There is a first cause (conclusion).

In addition to a defense of the premises, Rutten provides a five-step derivation of the conclusion from the premises: (1) showing that every caused composite contains a caused simple, (2) showing that the sum of all caused simples, M, is an object, (3) showing that M is not a cause, (4) showing that A, the cause of M, is uncaused, and (5) showing that A is a first cause (see p.127-128). Moreover, Rutten devotes a chapter to possible objections to his argument. As of yet, however, the argument does not seem to have faced very much scrutiny from other professional philosophers. I am still in the process of reflecting on the argument, and I hope this blog post will help me with that. I’m skeptical about the argument, but mere skepticism is somewhat cheap. Having a good objection to the argument is arguably more significant. Now, there are different sorts of objections we could have against this argument. I don’t see much promise in arguing against its validity (the argument is plausibly valid) and I don’t know a good parody or parity objection to the argument. That pretty much leaves de jure objections and de facto objections.

When it comes to these sorts of objections I see some possibilities, especially when it comes to premises 3 and 4. Rutten’s defense of premise 4 arguably depends largely on it being the case that a sum of objects is an object if it is a demarcated natural kind (see p.132-134). It seems to me that this is a vulnerability which might be targeted by various sorts of objections. One might try to argue, for instance, that connectedness is necessary for objecthood (if a lump of clay is split in two it seems there are now two objects), or that this view leads to absurd or unacceptable conclusions (e.g. God is (partially) part of an object, namely the sum of all simples). More promising is perhaps an objection against premise 3. It seems that Rutten may need the cause of the sum of all caused simples to be an object to get to a (unified) first cause (see p.156-157). For, arguably, if M was caused by the mere sum of two different uncaused objects, A and B, which are not two parts of a single object, and each of them caused 1/2 of the caused simples part of M, then there is not necessarily a first cause. For that to be the case there has to be a cause with an effect that is ontologically prior to every other caused object. But the effect of A or B arguably need not be ontologically prior to the effect of the other, and the sum of A and B is not necessarily an object, and, more importantly, A and B are not part of a single object. Of course, because of premise 3 this problem is avoided; on premise 3, if M is an object and is not the cause of another object, M is caused by another object (cf. p.125n175). But against this premise we may offer an objection along the following lines: ‘If premise 3 is true, there is no object which is caused by multiple objects and is not caused by only one object. There is an object which is caused by multiple objects and is not caused by only one object. Therefore, premise 3 is false.’ That being said, it may not be an easy task to show or make plausible that there is such a multi-caused object. In any case, these are some thoughts on Rutten’s cosmological argument.

A better objection to the third premise, and I write this as a later addition to the thoughts above, is a de jure objection which argues that the third premise is just as likely true as the causal thesis that every object causes or co-causes another object or is caused by an object or a mere sum of objects. The problem with is that this causal thesis cannot, within the present argument, take the place of the third premise, because then the conclusion no longer follows from the premises.

Then Jesus came up and said to them, “All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you. And remember, I am with you always, to the end of the age.”

Matthew 28:18-20 (NET2)

Both Jesus’s statement that he has received all authority in heaven and on earth and his instruction or command to his disciples may seem to come out of the blue. We may even suspect that Jesus never said such a thing, that we are dealing with things made up by (a) later Gentile Christian(s). After all, didn’t Jesus say that he was sent only for the lost sheep of the house of Israel (Matthew 15:24)?

But there is another explanation, one perhaps at least as plausible: All this flows from the deep logic of the Son of Man. For Jesus to be the Danielic Son of Man, which he arguably claims to be in all four Gospels, he must receive authority from God and all nations must serve/worship him (see Daniel 7:14). In an interesting way, it may also be related to Jesus’s belief in the coming of the kingdom of God. There is an Old Testament expectation that YHWH will one day become king over all the earth (see Zechariah 14:9) and something along these lines is found in Daniel 7:27 (ESV): “And the kingdom and the dominion and the greatness of the kingdoms under the whole heaven shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High; his kingdom shall be an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him.”

But why all this talk of teaching and making disciples? Why not try to subjugate the nations by military force? Perhaps we must look to the Old Testament again for an explanation. There may be other passages that shed light on Jesus’s actions. Isaiah 2:1-4 or Michah 4:1-2, perhaps? “For out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the LORD from Jerusalem.” Was this understood as instrumental to the coming of the many nations to the mountain of the house of YHWH (see Michah 4:1 and Isaiah 2:2)? Perhaps even more powerful and important is the start of Isaiah 42 (ESV): “Behold my servant, whom I uphold, my chosen, in whom my soul delights; I have put my Spirit upon him; he will bring for justice to the nations (…) He will not faint or be discouraged till he has established justice in the earth; and the coastlands wait for his law.”

But what about the baptizing? Why baptize Gentiles? And why in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit? Is it to make them ritually clean (see Leviticus 15), or is it to related to repentance and/or the start of a new life (Matthew 3:1-11, Romans 6:1-4), or is it related to following the example of Jesus (Mark 1:9) and/or to receiving the Holy Spirit (Mark 1:8, Acts 19:1-7), or are perhaps a number of these things the case? Remarkably, within Judaism in general there seems to be a practice of baptizing Gentile converts, and it is perhaps in relation to this that Jesus’s instruction should be understood. According to Maimonides, as quoted by T.F. Torrance, “in all ages when a Gentile is willing to enter into the Coventant, and gather himself under the wings of the Shekinah of God, and take upon him the yoke of the Law, he must be circumcised and be baptized and bring a sacrifice.”[1]

Finally, what are we to make of Jesus talk of always being ‘with’ his disciples? It may be that, of the whole passage, it is this part that the skeptic will find hardest to swallow. How could a first century Jew have said such a thing? The fact that some of the closest parallels in the Bible are statements about or by YHWH himself may not be very reassuring to him (see, for example, Genesis 28:15 and Joshua 1:5). But if verses like John 5:19 tell us something about the historical Jesus, then perhaps we should not be so suprised; “whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise”.

[1] T.F. Torrance, “Proselyte Baptism,” New Testament Studies 1, no. 2 (1954): 150.

There is a tendency to shy away from, or at least not engage in, publicly defending distinctive Christian beliefs and doctrines among Christians who could, if they made an effort, give a pretty decent defense. This is, perhaps, a mistake. Not that fears about doing so are entirely unfounded. Not at all, even when it comes to less controversial matters. But silence can be costly as well.

Consider first that the person who offers no arguments looks a lot like, and can easily be portrayed as, the person who has no arguments. Consider also that where only one plausible story is told, only one plausible story is heard, even in the land of a thousand stories. Moreover, just because the best spokespeople of a movement choose to remain silent does not mean that no-one will speak for it, and what they say may very well reflect badily on all the rest. Lastly, the benefits of silence are often bought with the blood of confession. Ordinarily, it is precisely the breaking of the silence, the starting to speak, which marks the beginning of one’s confession.

Some might object that it isn’t wise to set up a wall that someone can easily and triumphantly knock over. ‘Isn’t it better’, they might say, ‘to build no wall and wait for a better builder, someone who can build a wall so strong that no man can scale it or destory it?’ Yes, I too, hope for such a wall, a wall, perhaps, not made by human hands. But as we wait on its builder, we should perhaps not sit around and do nothing, but build our fragile walls, so that behind every wall that falls, there is another to greet the triumphant victor.

“Again, the kingdom of heaven is like a merchant searching for fine pearls. When he found a pearl of great value, he went out and sold everything he had and bought it.”

Matthew 13:45-46 (NET2)

In the parable, the pearl of great value was found by the merchant searching for fine pearls. Why he was searching for fine pearls? This is not explicitly stated. Perhaps he wanted fine pearls for himself. Perhaps he wanted to sell them. Perhaps he had a customer who wanted fine pearls.

Now, did he find what he was looking for? Perhaps the answer is an unqualified ‘Yes’; he found exactly what he was looking for. Perhaps the answer is a qualified ‘Yes’; he found a fine pearl, but it was particularly fine and indeed expensive. The answer may also be a qualified ‘No’; there was certainly some overlap between what he was seeking and what he found, but what he found was not fine pearls, but something else, a single very precious pearl.

Whether the merchant found exactly what he was looking for or something better, he seems to have stopped searching when he found the precious pearl. After finding the pearl, the merchant, that seeker of fine pearls, desired to buy it. Yet, he did not buy the pearl immediately. Instead, he first “went out and sold everything he had”. Apparently, the merchant did not have enough money with him to buy the pearl immediately and it seems that he did not have enough money at home either.

Now, the fact that the merchant went out and sold everything he had arguably tells us something about the value of the pearl and the desire of the merchant to have it. The pearl was so costly that he went out and sold everything he had in order that he (might) have enough to buy it. Conversely, the merchant desired to have it so much that he was willing to sell everything he had to have it. He desired to have it more than anything he had, indeed, more than everything he had.

We must not miss the fact that the merchant did in fact sell everything he had and did in fact buy the pearl. He did not weakly allege that he would go and sell everything only to go back and sell nothing. He did not leave the pearl of great value and quickly forget about it nor did he return to his possessions and lose his desire for it. No, he went out and sold everything he had and returned to buy the pearl of great value.

But what then is the pearl of great value? Arguably, the pearl in the story is the kingdom of heaven, or perhaps more precisely, a place in the kingdom of heaven. The Matthean Jesus arguably indicates, roughly, that (a place in) the kingdom of heaven is very valuable and that it can be obtained at a high price, a price nevertheless worth paying.

“Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets. I have not come to abolish these things but to fulfill them. I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth pass away not the smallest letter or stroke of a letter will pass from the law until everything takes place. So anyone who breakes one of the least of these commands and teaches others to do so will be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever obeys them and teaches others to do so will be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I tell you, unless your righteousness goes beyond that of the experts in the law and the Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven!”

Matthew 5:17-20 (NET2)

This passage gives us reason to believe that Jesus aimed to live completely according to the law of YHWH. It would be interesting to investigate how much of the data of the Gospels can be explained by with reference to Jesus aiming to do that. Some of Jesus’s own understanding(s) of how to live completely according to the law may be reconstructable from (teaching) passages in the Gospels.

It is arguable that Jesus aimed for something higher than ‘mere’ complete lawkeeping, perhaps a righteousness exceeding that to which the scribes and Pharisees aspired. There is reason to believe, in any case, that some of his ethical instructions went (far) beyond what was required by the law (see, for example, Mt 5:27-37).

The passage also provides evidence that Jesus warned (Jewish) disciples of his against breaking even the least of the commandments and teaching others (perhaps other Jews) to do so, or at least warned them that doing so would result in having the lowest status in the kingdom of heaven. Futhermore, it provides evidence that Jesus informed disciples of his that keeping all of the commandments would result in having high (or highest?) status in the kingdom of heaven.

Whether Jesus himself avoided law-breaking or teaching law-breaking is, for me, not entirely clear at the moment. There are some passages which may provide reason to think that Jesus’s instructions sometimes conflicted with the law (see, for example, Mt 5:38-39 and 5:43-44) or that he did not always keep the law (see, for example, John 7:53-8:11), perhaps in following his own ethical principles (e.g. ‘do not judge’).

How difficult it would be to have a righteousness exceeding that of the scribes and Pharisees is also not entirely clear. Arguably, they, or many of them, aspired to perfect law-keeping. But elsewhere we have evidence that Jesus accused them, or some of them, to neglecting the weightier matters of the law (see Mt 23:23).