It seems we can take a further step down the path of the last two posts:

1. There is a possible world in which the Christian God exists.
2. If the Christian God exists in one possible world, then the Christian God exists in all possible worlds.
3. If the Christian God exists in all possible worlds, then the Christian God exists.
4. Therefore, the Christian God exists.

This sort of argument will not necessarily persuade anyone of the existence of the Christian God. But it perhaps does show that there are ways of arguing philosophically for specifically the existence of the Christian God.

Building on my last post, it seems we can argue for the existence of a God that is not merely essentially trinitarian, but has all the essential features of the Christian God. Consider the argument below:

1. A necessarily existing God that has as its essential features all (and only) the essential features of the Christian God is metaphysically possible, i.e. exists in at least one possible world.
2. If (1), then there exists a God with all the essential features of the Christian God. (by S5 modal logic)
3. Therefore, there exists a God with all the essential features of the Christian God.

Now, this argument does not say anything about non-essential or accidental features of the Christian God, and thus perhaps does not quite deduce to the Christian God. But the argument, at least if it is sound (is valid and only has true premises), does provide evidential support for the claim that the Christian God exists.

Probably someone has already thought of making modal-ontological arguments for the Trinity, but it is perhaps nevertheless fun to consider the argument(s) below. I was partly inspired by a recent argument of dr. Beau Branson, and moved by talk in Is God the Best Explanation of Things? of an ‘a priori argument for Trinitarianism’ (p.89). Anyhow, here is first a simple argument for the Trinity and then a more elaborate one:

A simple argument

1. Possibly, the Trinity exists.
2. If (1), then the Trinity exists.
3. Therefore, the Trinity exists.

A more elaborate argument

1. A necessarily existing, essentially trinitarian God is metaphysically possible, i.e. exists in at least one possible world.
2. If (1), then a necessarily existing, essentially trinitarian God exists. (by S5 modal logic)
3. Therefore, a necessarily existing, essentially trinitarian God exists.

Of course, an obvious concern is that similar arguments can be run for all sorts of Gods.

Perhaps still a bit rough and unpolished, but here the argument is anyway:

1. In every prior state of reality something existed.
   1. Something exists.
   2. If (1) and there has not always been something, then something began to exist uncaused.
   3. It is impossible that something began to exist uncaused.
   4. Therefore, it is false that there has not always been something.
2. In every prior state of reality something existed with the ability to cause.
   1. There are things with causal power.
   2. If (1) and there has not always been something with causal power, then something with causal power began to exist without a cause.
   3. It is impossible that something with causal power began to exist without a cause.
   4. Therefore, it is false that there has not always been something with causal power.
3. The simplest explanation of something is probably true.
4. The simplest explanation of (1) and (2) is that there is one being that existed in all prior states and had causal power in all prior states.
5. It is impossible that a past eternal being is caused.
6. There are caused beings.
7. The simplest explanation of (6), given the previous steps, is that all caused beings are ultimately caused by one uncaused being that existed in all prior states and had causal power in all prior states.
8. Therefore, there probably is a single past eternal uncaused being eternally with causal power that ultimately caused all caused beings.

This blog post aims to help us inquire into God’s existence. First we will address two basic objections to such an inquiry. Then some different models of inquiring into God’s existence will be sketched. Next we’ll deal with the important topics of explanations, theories, evidence and arguments. After that I’ll outline some next steps we can take in our inquiry into God’s existence.

Objections

The first objection to our inquiry is that it is already clear that God does (not) exist, either because this is immediately obvious upon reflection or because the (non)existence of God has been proven. However, it is at least not obvious to all whether or not God exists. Indeed, there is actually deep disagreement on this matter and we have no uncontroversial (dis)proof of God’s existence. Even people that believe that God does (not) exist will often still grant that God’s (non)existence is nevertheless possible in light of what they know about reality. The second objection then is that it is in fact unknowable whether or not God exists. It is therefore, so the objection goes, pointless to inquire into this matter. But for many of us it is not completely clear at the outset that it is impossible for us to know if God exists, even if we are doubtful of this. Moreover, there seem to be things we can gain from such an inquiry which would make it worthwhile, for instance, a more informed view of the debate about God’s existence and the various arguments in favor or against it.

Models of Inquiry

One model for inquiring into God’s existence is what we might call ‘the research project’. Roughly, on this model, to inquire into God’s existence is to conduct a research project which involves the study of much academic literature and the publication of scholarly articles and monographs. This model can bring rigor, nuance, careful thinking and excellence to our inquiry into the existence of God. However, it can also turn our inquiry into a vanity project and subjugate it to the concerns of academic careerism. A second model is what we might term ‘the quest’. This model helps us think of our inquiry as something which may involve various dangers and risks and may require of us certain virtues such as courage, perseverance and love. A third model is ‘the pilgrimage’. This model reminds us that we are (potentially) dealing with holy matters. God is plausibly not to be trifled with, and we should perhaps conduct our inquiry with care and reverence. The final model is ‘the personal meeting’. We can easily come under the impression that God is the passive object of our inquiry, but perhaps we should approach God more as a subject, as Someone rather than Something, and as Someone that we can get to know personally. Perhaps by drawing on these different models of inquiry, we can inquire into God’s existence in a way that is both fitting and proper.

Explanations, Theories, Evidence and Arguments

An explanation is roughly a (set of) truth claim(s) that explain some piece of data or state of affairs. Rival explanations (i.e. explanations that provide alternative explanations of something) can be evaluated through comparing their internal consistency (coherence), ontological commitments and implications (simplicity and cost), and the extent to which they explain relevant data (explanatory power). The question of God’s existence can be part of discussions of larger theories of reality and explanations of the ultimate origins of the things we see around us. Discussing God in the context of metaphysics can take way some of the heatedness and unhelpful dynamics of conversations between atheists, theists and agnostics. However, in the process we can easily start treating God as a theoretical entity instead of as a personal being. We must not forget to also seek God directly, and to seek God as a Someone.

There are different accounts of what evidence is, but one way of characterizing evidence is as follows: x is evidence for y if x indicates or suggests that y is the case. A theory, which is not quite the same thing as an explanation but is (typically) part of an explanation, is supported by evidence, on this account, if there are things which suggest that the theory is true. Note that this account of evidence does not rule out that some data is evidence for rival theories. Theories can also be supported by arguments. Arguments are roughly sets of claims structured in a way to support some conclusion(s). Simple arguments contain a conclusion and one or two premises which support the conclusion. But arguments can be much longer and also have different argumentative forms (it is common to think that there are deductive, inductive and abductive arguments). Arguments can be more definite than mere evidence (because of their conclusion) and they can relate with theories in such a way that the theory can only be true if the arguments are in some way flawed (e.g. false premises or flawed logic). When it comes to God’s existence it is thus the case that if God exists, there must be some flaw in all arguments against God’s existence, a flaw we might be able to discover through the study of such arguments. (Of course, it is possible that God exists and arguments against a faulty conception of God are not flawed). Likewise, if God does not exist, all arguments for the existence of God must have some flaw.

Next steps

So what sort of next steps can we take in our inquiry into God’s existence? Well, for one, we might outline in more detail what exactly we are after, what dangers and obstacles we might face, what might be required for us to succeed in our inquiry and what methods we could try to use to attain our goals. We could also look to others who have inquired into God’s existence. What steps did they take and what mistakes did they make along the way? Looking into the philosophical debate about God’s existence is also a good option in light of the relationship between arguments and theories. Also, we might try to find people who are willing to inquire with us, inquiring into God’s existence need not be a solitary project. Of course, and not unimportantly, we might ask for divine assistance in our inquiry and ask that God’s existence might be revealed to us.

I’ve been making a little bit of progress in recent months when it comes to arguments for God and the path to a reasonable theism, because I have finally started to see ways of breaking tie between a finite and an infinite past causal series. Every caused object is, it seems, the result of a causal series. If each causal series is infinite, there is no first cause (and arguably no God), but if at least one causal series is finite there is / has been at least one object (the first member of the finite series) that is not caused by another object. Such an object would have interesting features. It has / had some degree of power (the power to bring about the next member of the series) and it exercised that power in an unusual way (it wasn’t caused by something else to cause the next member). Further, it is either somehow caused by itself (which is difficult to understand) or entirely uncaused (which is also strange). Moreover, if its existence is not in some sense necessary (i.e. it must exist in this possible world or it must exist in some but not all possible worlds or it must exist in all possible worlds), then it seems the existence of the caused object ultimately becomes inexplicable (it is a result of something which needn’t have existed).

Now, one might try to avoid such strange objects by theorising that all past causal series are infinite, but that involves postulating infinitely many things to explain the existence of caused objects. That seems a bit excessive considering that we could explain all caused objects with only finitely many things. For example, all caused objects could be said to have a finite causal series which eventually goes back to one and the same first cause (a simpler, or at least less ontologically heavy, theory than the theory that there are distinct finite series which each have their own unique first cause, meaning that there are multiple first causes). More problematically, (at least some) infinite past causal series are themselves strange and it is not entirely clear that causation via an infinite past causal series is even possible if the members come into existence one after the other. Consider the following: If a caused object is caused by a past infinite causal series in which each member comes into existence through the prior causation of the member before it (the sort of infinite causal series that we typically think of as an alternative explanation of caused objects), then an infinite number of things need to have happened before one gets to the caused object. But it seems an infinite number of things cannot have happened. If you need to read an endless number of pages before you get to the end of a book, then it seems it is impossible to get to the end of it.

But there are admittedly also some difficulties with, or at least difficult questions about, the causation of the first cause. First, does it always (as long as it exists) cause the next member to come into existence? If so, does the next member always exist alongside the first cause (being always caused by it)? If not, why does the first cause start to cause the next member? Now, perhaps a certain arbitrariness can be avoided if the first cause has to go through a number of steps to cause the second member. In this way, the second member being co-existent with the first cause can perhaps also be avoided (there was a time or at least state when it was not). Second, is the whole causal series in some sense necessary (such that every member either must exist by itself or must exist because it follows necessarily from the preceding cause) and if not how does the (coming into) existence of some members not become inexplicable? The trouble is that if every effect follows necessarily and the first cause necessarily exists and necessarily causes the second member (exists in all possible worlds and causes the second member in all possible worlds), then it seems it is impossible that the effects never exist (there is no possible version of reality in which they do not at some point exist).

Here I want to share a few thoughts on the relationship between belief and evidence. With exceptions, something is evidence for a thesis, it seems, if it indicates or suggests that the thesis is true. Plausibly, beliefs that x are partially caused by having (encountered) evidence that x. If all beliefs are partially caused by evidence in such a way, then this sheds a sympathetic light on all beliefs and all that believe something. We may still think certain people believe things that are not true, but we cannot then maintain that there is or has been no evidence for what they believe. Further, seemingly, beliefs can also lead to having (encountered) evidence. A belief that x is (possibly) the case may lead one to do certain things which in turn lead one to acquiring or encountering evidence that x. For instance, the belief that one’s bike may have been stolen may lead one check the shed and to find it empty, thus providing one with (further) evidence that it has indeed been stolen.

Interestingly, the fact that (some)one believes something may, at least under certain circumstances, constitute evidence that what is believed is true. For instance, if most of the beliefs a person has are true, then for any belief, b, that person has, b is probably true. Of course, the longer one selects b’s from the pool of b’s the more likely it is that one has selected at least one b that is false. Also, if one selects most of the b’s and is somehow able to determine that most of them are indeed true, then the remaining b’s are probably false. However, at least under certain circumstances, if such a person believes that x, then that fact would constitute evidence that x. So, interestingly, a person that believes in God and knows that most of her beliefs are true (e.g. because she knows they have been produced by reliable factulties), has, at least under certain circumstances, evidence that God exists, even if she does not have an argument that would convince others that God exists. Note that, under certain circumstances, she wouldn’t even need to know that most of her beliefs are true. If she knew instead that most of her beliefs were based on evidence, then, given certain things, her belief that God exists is probably based on evidence. The fact that she believes that God exists could then also constitute evidence that God exists. But we needn’t talk merely about individuals, consider the following arguments:

Argument 1 (Inductive)

1. Most things presently believed are true.
2. Many people presently believe that God exists.
3. Therefore, God exists.

An obvious move is to deny (1), but note that this can lead to problems: If it is false that most things presently believed are true, then under certain circumstances (e.g. the ratio of true and false beliefs is the same in all that have beliefs), most of what you presently believe is false. Of course, you could argue that although (1) is false you are a special sort of person that does not have (mostly) false beliefs. But one could also offer a partity objection to the argument since there are also many people that do not believe that God exists.

Argument 2 (Inductive)

1. Generally, if many people presently believe that x, there is evidence that x.
2. Many people presently believe that God exists.
3. Therefore, there is evidence that God exists.

Argument 3 (Deductive)

1. Generally, if someone believes that x, she has encountered evidence that x.
2. Many people presently believe that God exists.
3. There will be people, not yet alive, who will believe that God exists.
4. If (1)-(3), then there probably is evidence that God exists.
5. Therefore, there probably is evidence that God exists.

One way to object against these arguments is to argue that it is impossible to have evidence for God’s existence. If so, then, (4) in argument 3 is false and in argument 2, (1) and (2) provide little by way of support for the conclusion. But the position that it is impossible to have evidence for God’s existence is not very easy to defend. Merely arguing that God does not exist won’t cut it, because one (arguably) can have evidence for things that are not the case. Arguing that nothing could constitute a proof that God exists won’t cut it either, because something can be evidence for x without proving that x.

Now for an argument less strong than the one of the previous post, primarily because of premise 8 (for which I offer no argument here), but it is perhaps nevertheless interesting:

Argument:

1. Let ‘A’ refer to every thing that exists or has existed.
2. For any x, x is not caused to exist by itself.
3. For any x, if x is caused to exist, x is only caused by at least one thing that exists or has existed.
4. Either all of A is caused to exist, or all of A is not caused to exist, or some of A is caused and some of A is not caused to exist.
5. Some of A is caused to exist.
6. If all of A is caused to exist and only finitely many things exist or have existed, then some x is caused to exist by itself.
7. If some of A is not caused to exist, then something exists or has existed which is not caused to exist.
8. Only finitely many things exist or have existed.
9. Therefore, something exists or has existed which is not caused to exist.

Argument for Premise 2:

1. For any a and any b, if b is caused to exist by a, then a is not identical to b.
2. If (1), then for any x, if x is caused to exist by itself, then x is not identical to itself.
3. For any x, x is identical to itself.
4. Therefore, for any x, x is not caused to exist by itself.

Argument for Premise 3:

1. Only something that exists or has existed can cause something to exist.
2. If (1), then for any x, if x is caused to exist, x is only caused by at least one thing that exists or has existed.
3. Therefore, for any x, if x is caused to exist, x is only caused by at least one thing that exists or has existed.

Argument for Premise 4:

1. It is impossible that all of A is caused to exist and all of A is not caused to exist or some of A is not caused to exist.
2. It is impossible that all of A is not caused to exist and all of A is caused to exist or some of A is caused to exist.
3. It is impossible that some of A is caused and some of A is not caused to exist and all of A is caused to exist or all of A is not caused to exist.
4. Therefore, either all of A is caused to exist or all of A is not caused to exist or some of A is caused and some of A is not caused to exist.

Argument for Premise 5:

1. Let ‘A’ refer to every thing that exists or has existed.
2. If there is something that is caused to exist, some of A is caused to exist.
3. There is something that is caused to exist.
4. Therefore, some of A is caused to exist.

Argument for Premise 6:

1. Let ‘A’ refer to every thing that exists or has existed.
2. If all of A is caused to exist, then for any a that exists or has existed, a has a causal series.
3. The causal series of a is either finite or infinite.
4. If there are only finitely many things that exist or have existed, then a has a finite causal series.
5. If a has a finite causal series and all of A is caused to exist, then a is caused to exist by a.
6. Therefore, if all of A is caused to exist and only finitely many things exist or have existed, then some x is caused to exist by itself.

Argument for Premise 7:

1. Let ‘A’ refer to every thing that exists or has existed.
2. If it is false that something exists or has existed which is not caused to exist, then it is false that some of A is not caused to exist.
3. If it is true that something exists or has existed which is not caused to exist, then it is true that some of A is not caused to exist.
4. It cannot be true and false that some of A is not caused to exist.
5. It cannot be true and false that something exists or has existed which is not caused to exist.
6. Therefore, it is impossible that it is true that some of A is not caused to exist and not true that something exists or has existed which is not caused to exist.
7. Therefore, if some of A is not caused to exist, then something exists or has existed which is not caused to exist.

1. Either something exists or nothing exists.
2. Anything that exists is either caused or uncaused.
3. Anything that is caused has a finite or an infinite causal series.
4. Anything that has a finite causal series has an uncaused first cause.
5. Therefore, either nothing exists, or something exists which is uncaused, or something exists which has an infinite causal series, or something exists which has an uncaused first cause.

If it is the case that nothing exists, then that is an extremely remarkable ‘state of affairs’, since it so strongly seems to be the case that there are things which exist. You and I, for instance, or the letters on this page. Further, if there is something with an infinite causal series that would also be very remarkable. Just ponder it for a moment. How would such a beginningless causal series work? How could there be such an unbroken series of causes, stretching back, or down, forever and ever? But if there is, or has been, some uncaused thing then is this is hardly less remarkable. How could there be something uncaused? What accounts for is (sometime) existence?

Of course, the conclusion of the argument can be avoided by denying one or more of the premises. But go right ahead, for this results in remarkable things also. It would be remarkable if it is false that either something exists or nothing exists. It would be remarkable if it is false that anything that exists is either caused or uncaused. It would be remarkable if it is false that anything that has a finite causal series has an uncaused first cause. And what about denying that the argument is valid? Well, it seems valid to me. But, go right ahead, show me how it is invalid.

“According to the Christological lesson of the previous section, God has a reason not to reveal to typical humans now the full divine purpose in allowing unjust suffering and evil in human lives. Part of the reason is that typical humans would lack now the understanding needed to handle (a stament of) the purpose aright. They would fail, as in the case of the apostle Peter, to understand properly and therefore would tend toward counterproductive resistance to God and God’s purpose.”

Paul K. Moser, “Theodicy, Christology, and Divine Hiding,” 196

Continuing the posts on the problem of evil, I’d like to offer a few thoughts informed by my reading of Paul Moser’s article “Theodicy, Christology, and Divine Hiding: Neutralizing the Problem of Evil”.[1] For some years now, I have been an admirer of Moser’s work, and I was interested in what he had to say on the problem of evil. However, this post is not so much about Moser’s views, as about developing my own thought on the problem. That being said, I want to comment briefly on something he writes about John 11:3-4: “It may be tempting to generalize on the comment by Jesus, and thus to propose that all suffering and evil are ‘for God’s glory’. Such generalizing, however, would be a mistake.” First, we note that Moser does not discuss the somewhat similar episode at the start of John 9. Second, although Moser may be right about the generalizing, these passages do help us think of new (candidate) examples of goods that require evils (see my two previous posts). For instance, in a world without evil, there can be no defeat of evils nor triumph over them. There is no healing of the blind in a world without blindness; no resurrection in a world without death. One can dispute that such goods outweigh the evils required for them, but that they are required is difficult to deny.

Further, Moser’s article helped me see that there can be a theistic explanation of the fact, f, that we do not have or cannot offer a satisfactory theistic explanation of certain evils, on which this is intentional on the part of God. Among theists, it is fairly common to explain f (or something like it) in terms of the limitations of human knowledge or cognitive powers. But the idea (and this is not necessarily what Moser holds) that God could be intentionally withholding key information or perhaps even frustrating our explanatory efforts adds something interesting to the mix. Just as the existence of arguments for atheism can be explained by partial hiddenness theism (PHT), on which, God does not presently want God’s existence to be obvious to everyone, so can PHT explain why there are certain evils which resist our explanatory powers.

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[1] Paul K. Moser, “Theodicy, Christology, and Divine Hiding: Neutralizing the Problem of Evil,” The Expository Times 129, no. 5 (2018): 191-200.