In this blogpost, I will briefly sketch an abductive argument for theory that there exists an independent, necessarily existing, concrete being. What is in view here is a being that is not ontologically dependent on something else for its existence, which exists in all possible worlds (versions of reality), and that is not an abstract entity (e.g. a number). This theory will be refered to as T1.

The argument starts with the fact that something concrete exists. For reference, I will call this fact ‘F‘. According to the argument, T1 best explains why F is the case. After all, T1 predicts F more strongly than T2, the theory that something exists in some but not all possible worlds. According to T2, there is at least one possible world that is empty in the sense of containing no concrete beings. After all, the probability of F on T1 is 1, while the probability of F on T2 is <1.

Furthermore, T1 predicts F equally well as T3, the theory that all possible worlds contain at least one contingent entity (i.e. an entity that exists in at least one but not all possible worlds), but no necessary entities. But T3 is less simple than T1 and faces explanatory challenges. After all, T3 must postulate at least two possibly existing contingent beings. Further, the contingent beings that T3 postulates are either ontologically dependent or ontologically independent. If ontologically independent, then it is not clear why they do not exist in all possible worlds. If ontologically dependent, then the dependence relation is either infinite or circular. If circular, then, ultimately, they depend on themselves. However, it is not clear that this is even possible, since it means that the contingent entity precedes itself ontologically. And if the dependence relation is infinite, then T3 postulates infinitely more beings than T1, making it much less simple.