There seem to be contigent beings, beings that do not exist necessarily, that do not exist in every possible version of reality. Let us, at least for the sake of argument, suppose there are such beings. Why then do they exist? This cannot be explained simply in terms of a necessary first cause. After all, the necessary first cause could, it seems, have caused everything necessarily. Then there would have been other beings besides the first cause, but none of them would have been contigent. That the first cause has caused contigent beings is thus something seemingly in need of explanation. Perfect being theism is perhaps able to offer such an explanation along the following lines: (1) the necessary first cause is perfect, and (2) a perfect being would (be able to) cause contigent beings.

A similar issue is that of contigent actions. It seems at least some of our actions are contigent. We didn’t have to do them, we were free to do otherwise. If we have the power to act freely, then this is something remarkable, why would we have such a power at all? It is not immediately obvious why a naturalistic necessary first cause would cause beings with such a power. But it seems that perfect being theism can explain this: We are ultimately caused by a perfect God, who wanted there to be creatures with a (limited) power to act freely in the world.