As you may know, I’m writing a MA thesis on new philosophical arguments for God developed within recent natural theology and analytic philosophy of religion (2000-2020). And, althought my training is in theology, in the past month or so I’ve formulated some arguments myself (see, for instance, this previous blogpost). Perhaps the arguments below are not particularly good arguments, but they have a few things going for them: (1) they seem deductively valid, (2) they start from a rather modest premise that at least some nontheists will think true or at least plausibly true, and that seems rather costly to deny, and (3) they lead straight to the conclusion that God exists. The arguments are somewhat abstract, appealing as they do to some x, which could, perhaps, be anything from a particular religious experience to an entire universe. In light of this, I am not quite sure how to categorize them. Since they make use of modal notions and principles, and have causal elements, we might call them modal-causal arguments. Further, it seems to me that the talk of ‘possible worlds’, which might be confusing to people unfamiliar with analytic philosophy, can be simply exchanged for talk of ‘possible versions of reality’ or even ‘possible states of affairs’. Lastly, I find the arguments below interesting and am still in the process of examining and developing them.

Modal-Causal Argument Type 1: There Is Some X

Argument 1

1. There is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. If (1), there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
3. God, by defintion, is such that if God exists or has existed in some possible world, God exists eternally in all possible worlds.
4. If God exists eternally in all possible worlds, then God exists.
5. Therefore, God exists.

Argument 2

1. There is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. If (1), there is a possible world, W1, in which x exists and in which x is or has been caused (partially) by God.
3. For God to (have) (partially) cause(d) x in W1, God must exist or must have existed in W1.
4. If (1)-(3), there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
5. Therefore, there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
6. God, by definition, is such that if God exists or has existed in some possible world, God exists eternally in all possible worlds.
7. The actual world is a possible world.
8. If God exists eternally in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world.
9. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
10. Therefore, God exists.

Modal-Causal Argument Type 2: There Possibly is Some X

Argument 1

1. There possibly is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. If (1), there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
3. God, by definition, is such that if God exists or has existed in some possible world, God exists eternally in all possible worlds.
4. If God exists eternally in all possible worlds, then God exists.
5. Therefore, God exists.

Argument 2

1. There possibly is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. If (1), there is a possible world in which there exists an x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
3. If there is a possible world in which there exists an x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God, then there is a possible world, W1, in which x exists and x is caused or has been caused by (partially) by God.
4. For God to (have) (partially) cause(d) x in W1, God must exist or have existed in W1.
5. If (1)-(4), there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
6. Therefore, there is a possible world in which God exists or has existed.
7. God, by definition, is such that if God exists or has existed in some possible world, God exists eternally in all possible worlds.
8. The actual world is a possible world.
9. Therefore, God exists in the actual world.
10. If God exists in the actual world, then God exists.
11. Therefore, God exists.

Some Remarks

A number of argumentative strategies could be employed in defense of the first premise of the above arguments. First, one could appeal to (the fact of) shared seemings and beliefs in arguing for the truth of the first premise. Theists (typically) believe that there are things which are (partially) caused by God and, doing so, are arguably committed to the first premise. Moreover, the denial of the first premise is arguably incompatible with the affirmation of divine omnipotence. However, it seems, many nontheists also believe or at least find plausible what is claimed by the first premise. Second, one could offer a number of very plausible candidates for x. For such candidates one could look to things that are appealed to in other arguments for God. Third, if one has presented a number of such candidates one could develop an inductive argument for x arguing that the existence of (plausible) candidates for x is more likely on the hypothesis that there is (possibly) an x, than on the hypothesis that there is not (possibly) an x. Fourth, one could put forward an inductive argument for there (possibly) being an x from the ontological diversity and richness of (potential) reality.

The second premise of the shorter arguments can be defended with an argument along such lines:

1. There is some x such that x is possibly caused (partially) by God.
2. Either there is a possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God or there is no possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God.
3. If there is no possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God, then x could not be possibly caused (partially) by God.
4. If (1)-(3), then there is a possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God.
5. It is not possible that God does not exist in a possible state of affairs in which x is caused (partially) by God.
6. Therefore, there is a possible state of affairs in which God exists.

The third premise of the shorter arguments is more or less a partial definition of God or a statement of certain characteristics of God, or at least characteristics God is often thought to have (necessary existence, eternal existence). If necessary, the argument can be reformulated such that it is an argument for a being that essentially exists necessarily and eternally, and essentially is perfectly good, powerful, knowing, etc.

The fourth premise of the shorter arguments is pretty uncontroversial, but if necessary modifications can be made to the argument (e.g. spelling out that the actual world is a possible world and so forth).